Article One of the United States Constitution describes the powers of Congress, the legislative branch of the federal government. The Article establishes the powers of and limitations on the Congress, consisting of a House of Representatives composed of Representatives, with each state gaining or losing representation in proportion to its population, and a Senate, composed of two Senators from each state. The article details the manner of election and qualifications of members of each House. It outlines legislative procedure and enumerates the powers vested in the legislative branch. Finally, it establishes limits on the powers of both Congress and the states.
There are ten sections in the article. The Vesting Clause (Section One) vests "all legislative powers herein granted" to the Congress. Sections Two and Three deal with the House of Representatives and Senate respectively. The sections set the composition, term lengths, qualifications of members, officers, and methods of filling vacancies for both Houses. Section Two also requires direct taxes to "be apportioned among the several States... according to their respective Numbers" and that a census be held every ten years. Section Three also provides that the Vice President of the United States shall be President of the Senate but shall have only a tie-breaking vote. The House of Representatives is given the sole power of impeachment while the Senate is given the sole power of the trial of impeachments.
Section Four gives to state legislatures the power to set the "times, Places and Manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives," but provides for Congressional oversight of elections. The section also provides that Congress shall assemble "at least once in every year" and sets a default date for the initial assembly, later modified by the Twentieth Amendment. Section Five deals with procedure, providing that "Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members, and a Majority of each shall constitute a Quorum to do Business," although a small number may adjourn and compel the attendance of absent members. The section also gives to each house the power to "determine the rules of its proceedings," including the power to punish or expel a member". Each house is required to "keep a journal of its proceedings" and publish it from time to time except in special circumstances. The section also provides that neither House may adjourn without the consent of the other for more than three days or change its meeting place, without the consent of the other House. Section Six provides that members of Congress shall receive salaries, have a limited privilege from arrest during sessions of Congress, and immunity "for any Speech or Debate in either House." The section also provides that no member may simultaneously serve in Congress and "be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States", and also may not serve in any such office "which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been increased" during the member's term in office.
Section Seven deals with legislative procedure, providing that all bills for revenue must originate in the House of Representative. The section also introduces the veto power of the President of the United States, and describes its powers and limitations.
Section Eight gives to the Congress certain broad enumerated powers. Among these are the power to lay and collect taxes and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States; to borrow money on the credit of the United States, to regulate interstate, foreign, and Indian commerce; (5) To coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin, and fix the standard of weights and measures; and to create courts inferior to the Supreme Court among many others. The section also gives to Congress the power to "make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States."
Section Nine places limits on powers of Congress and the government. The section provides that the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended "except when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it"; prohibits bills of attainder or ex post facto laws; bars the imposition of taxes or duties on articles exported from any state or the granting of preference to ports of one state over another; and prohibits civil officers from accepting titles of nobility without the consent of Congress. The section also provides that "No money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law," and that a statement of receipts and expenditures of public money "be published from time to time." This section barred Congress from banning the import of slaves from abroad or from laying a duty of more than 10 dollars on each imported slave until 1808; Congress banned the slave trade on January 1, 1808, as soon as constitutionally allowed.
Section Ten sets limits on states, reserving certain powers exclusively to the Congress. States are prohibited from coining money or making anything other than gold or silver coin legal tender for payment of debts and are prohibited from entering into treaties or alliances, although compacts with other states are allowed with the permission of Congress. States are also not permitted to lay duties, keep troops or warships in peacetime with Congressional approval, or engage in war unless actually invaded or in imminent danger. States also are barred from laying imposts or duties on imports or exports except for the fulfillment of state inspection laws, which may be revised by Congress, and any net revenue of such duties is remitted to the federal treasury. Finally, states, like Congress, may not pass bills of attainder or ex post facto laws, nor grant any title of nobility.
Section 1: Legislative power vested in Congress
Section 1 is a vesting clause, granting all the federal government's legislative authority to Congress. Similar vesting clauses are found in Articles II and III, which grant "the executive power" to the President and "the judicial power" to the federal judiciary. In legal garb, the working definition of "herein" connotes specificity and exclusivity. The Vesting Clauses thus establishes the principle of separation of powers by specifically giving to each branch of the federal government only those powers it can exercise and no others. This means that no branch may exercise powers that properly belong to another (e.g., since the legislative power is vested in Congress, the executive and judiciary may not enact laws).
The language "herein granted" in Article I's vesting clause has been interpreted to mean that the powers Congress are to exercise are exclusively those specifically provided for in Article I. The clause "herein granted" was further defined and elaborated by the tenth amendment. Thus, this congressional clause is contrasted by the general vesting of the executive and judicial powers in Articles II and III in the branches of government those articles govern, which has been interpreted to mean that those branches enjoy "residual" or "implied" powers beyond those specifically mentioned, as contrasted with the Congress, which is vested with those legislative powers "herein granted;" however, there is substantial contemporary disagreement about the precise extent of the powers conferred by the general vesting clauses.
As a corollary to the fact that Congress, and only Congress, is vested with the legislative power, Congress (in theory) cannot delegate legislative authority to other branches of government (e.g., the Executive Branch), a rule known as the nondelegation doctrine. However, the Supreme Court has ruled that Congress does have latitude to delegate regulatory powers to executive agencies as long as it provides an "intelligible principle" which governs the agency's exercise of the delegated regulatory authority. In practice, the Supreme Court has only invalidated four statutes on non-delegation grounds in its history, three of which were invalidated in the mid-1930s. The fourth, the Line Item Veto Act of 1996, was invalidated in 1998. The nondelegation doctrine is primarily used now as a way of interpreting a congressional delegation of authority narrowly, in that the courts presume Congress intended only to delegate that which it certainly could have, unless it clearly demonstrates it intended to "test the waters" of what the courts would allow it to do.
Although not specifically mentioned in the Constitution, Congress has also long asserted the power to investigate and the power to compel cooperation with an investigation. The Supreme Court has affirmed these powers as an implication of Congress's power to legislate. Since the power to investigate is an aspect of Congress's power to legislate, it is as broad as Congress's powers to legislate. However, it is also limited to inquiries that are "in aid of the legislative function;" Congress may not "expose for the sake of exposure." It is uncontroversial that a proper subject of Congress's investigation power is the operations of the federal government, but Congress's ability to compel the submission of documents or testimony from the President or his subordinates is often-discussed and sometimes controversial (see executive privilege), although not often litigated. As a practical matter, the limitation of Congress's ability to investigate only for a proper purpose ("in aid of" its legislative powers) functions as a limit on Congress's ability to investigate the private affairs of individual citizens; matters that simply demand action by another branch of government, without implicating an issue of public policy necessitating legislation by Congress, must be left to those branches due to the doctrine of separation of powers. The courts are highly deferential to Congress's exercise of its investigation powers, however. Congress has the power to investigate that which it could regulate, and the courts have interpreted Congress's regulatory powers broadly since the Great Depression.
Additionally, the courts will not inquire into whether Congress has an improper motive for an investigation (i.e., using a legitimate legislative purpose as a cover for "expos[ing] for the sake of exposure"), focusing only on whether the matter is within Congress's power to regulate and, thus, investigate. Persons called before a congressional investigatory committee are entitled to the constitutional guarantees of individual rights, such as those in the Bill of Rights. Congress can punish those who do not cooperate with an investigation via holding violators in contempt of Congress.
Section 2: House of Representatives
Clause 1: Composition and election of Members
Section Two provides for the election of the House of Representatives every second year. Since Representatives are to be "chosen... by the People," State Governors are not allowed to appoint temporary replacements when vacancies occur in a state's delegation to the House of Representatives; instead, the Governor of the state is required by clause 4 to issue a writ of election calling a special election to fill the vacancy.
The Constitution does not directly guarantee the franchise to anyone; rather, it provides that those qualified to vote in elections for the largest chamber of a state's legislature may vote in congressional elections as well. Amendments to the Constitution, however, have restricted the states' ability to set such qualifications. The Fifteenth Amendment and Nineteenth Amendment bar the use of race or sex as qualifications to vote in both federal and state elections. Furthermore, the Twenty-sixth Amendment provides that states may not set age requirements higher than eighteen years. The Twenty-fourth Amendment bars states from using the payment of a tax as a voter qualification in federal elections. Moreover, since the Supreme Court has recognized voting as a fundamental right, the Equal Protection Clause places very tight limitations (albeit with uncertain limits) on the states' ability to define voter qualifications; it is fair to say that qualifications beyond citizenship, residency, and age are usually questionable.
Since clause 3 provides that Members of the House of Representatives are apportioned state-by-state and that each state is guaranteed at least one Representative, exact population equality between all districts is not guaranteed and, in fact, is currently impossible, because while the size of the House of Representatives is fixed at 435, several states had less than 1/435 of the national population at the time of the last reapportionment in 2000. However, the Supreme Court has interpreted the provision of Clause One that Representatives shall be elected "by the People" to mean that, in those states with more than one member of the House of Representatives, each congressional election district within the state must have nearly identical populations.
Clause 2: Qualifications of Members
The Constitution provides three requirements for Representatives: A Representative must be at least 25 years old, must be an inhabitant of the state in which he or she is elected, and must have been a citizen of the United States for the previous seven years. There is no requirement that a Representative reside within the district in which he represents; although thus is usually the case, there have been occasional exceptions.
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Qualifications Clause as an exclusive list of qualifications that cannot be supplemented by a house of Congress exercising its Section 5 authority to "judge...the...qualifications of its own members" or by a state in its exercise of its Section 4 authority to prescribe the "times, places and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives." The Supreme Court, as well as other federal courts, have repeatedly barred states from additional restrictions, such as imposing term limits on members of Congress, allowing members of Congress to be subject to recall elections, or requiring that Representatives live in the congressional district in which they represent.
However, the United States Supreme Court has ruled that certain ballot access requirements, such as filing fees and submitting a certain number of valid petition signatures do not constitute additional qualifications and thus few Constitutional restrictions exist as to how harsh ballot access laws can be.
Clause 3: Apportionment of Representatives and taxes
The Constitution does not fix the size of the House of Representatives; instead, this clause empowers Congress to determine the size of the House as part of the apportionment process, so long as the size of the House does not exceed 1 member for every 30,000 of the country's total population and the size of the state's delegation does not exceed 1 for every 30,000 of the state's population (although these limits have not been approached since the Founding). The number is currently fixed at 435, which is around a 1 Representative: 700,000 Citizen ratio. A particular number of Representatives is assigned to each State according to its share of the national population; election districts are not drawn nationally and do not cross state boundaries. Congress additionally has the authority to prescribe what method shall be used to allocate Representatives to each state; currently, Congress has prescribed the use of the Equal Proportions method.
The Constitution mandates that a Census be conducted every ten years to determine the populations of the States, and this clause provided for a temporary apportionment of seats until the first Census could be conducted. The population of a state originally included (for congressional apportionment purposes) all "free persons", three-fifths of "other persons" (i.e., slaves) and excluded untaxed Native Americans. Presently, the Census counts illegal immigrants, and Census figures are used to determine congressional seats. The three-fifths clause was a compromise between Southern and Northern states in which three-fifths of the population of slaves would be counted for enumeration purposes regarding both the distribution of taxes and the apportionment of the members of the United States House of Representatives. This compromise had the effect of increasing the political power of slave-holding states by increasing their share of seats in the House of Representatives, and consequently their share in the Electoral College (where a state's influence over the election of the President is tied to the size of its congressional delegation). Following the Civil War, the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments changed this arrangement by (respectively) abolishing slavery, and superseding the three-fifths clause by requiring that a state's population for apportionment purposes was to be determined by "counting the whole number of Persons" in the state, "excluding Indians not taxed." Since there are at present no such untaxed Native Americans (Indians), all persons inhabiting a state whether citizens or not count towards the population of that state in determining the state's congressional apportionment.
Originally, the amount of direct taxes that could be collected from any State was tied directly to its share of the national population. On the basis of this requirement, application of the income tax to income derived from real estate and specifically income in the form of dividends from personal property ownership such as stock shares was found to be unconstitutional because it was not apportioned among the states; that is to say, there was no guarantee that a State with 10% of the country's population paid 10% of those income taxes collected, because Congress had not fixed an amount of money to be raised and apportioned it between the States according to their respective shares of the national population. To permit the levying of such an income tax, Congress proposed and the states ratified the Sixteenth Amendment, which superseded this requirement by specifically providing that Congress could levy a tax on income "from whatever source derived" without it being apportioned among the States or otherwise based on a State's share of the national population.
Clause 4: Vacancies
Section 2, Clause 4, provides that when vacancies occur in the House of Representatives, it is not the job of the House of Representatives to arrange for a replacement, but the job of the State whose vacant seat is up for refilling. Moreover, the State Governor may not appoint a temporary replacement, but must instead arrange for a special election to fill the vacancy. The original qualifications and procedures for holding that election are still valid.
Clause 5: Speaker and other officers; Impeachment
Section Two further provides that the House of Representatives may choose its Speaker and its other officers. Though the Constitution does not mandate it, every Speaker has been a member of the House of Representatives. The Speaker rarely presides over routine House sessions, choosing instead to deputize a junior member to accomplish the task.
Finally, Section Two grants to the House of Representatives the sole power of impeachment. Although the Supreme Court has not had an occasion to interpret this specific provision, the Court has suggested that the grant to the House of the "sole" power of impeachment makes the House the exclusive interpreter of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Impeachments are tried in the Senate (as discussed below).
Section 3: Senate
Clause 1: Composition; Election of Senators
Section Three provides that each state is entitled to two Senators chosen for a term of six years. The state legislatures originally chose the means of choosing the Senators. This provision has been superseded in 1913 by the Seventeenth Amendment, which provides for the direct election of Senators by the respective states' voters.
Generally, Article Five requires that a proposal to amend the Constitution garner a two-thirds majority in both Houses of Congress, and then be ratified by three-fourths of the state legislatures. Section Three of Article I is one of a handful of clauses on which Article Five places special restrictions to be amended; in this case, Article Five provides that "no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate." Thus, no individual state may have its representation in the Senate adjusted without its consent unless all other states have an identical change. That is to say, an amendment that changed this clause to provide that all states would get only one Senator (or three Senators, or any other number) could be ratified through the normal process, but an amendment that provided for some basis of representation other than strict numerical equality (for example, population, wealth, or land area) would require the assent of every state.
Clause 2: Classification of Senators; Vacancies
After the first group of Senators was elected to the First Congress (1789 1791), the Senators were divide into three "classes" as nearly equal in size as possible, as required by this section. This was done in May 1789 by lot. Those Senators grouped in the first class had their term expire after only two years; those Senators in the second class had their term expire after only four years, instead of six. After this, all Senators from those States have been elected to six-year terms, and as new States have joined the Union, their Senate seats have been assigned to one of the three classes, maintaining each grouping as nearly equal in size as possible. In this way, election is staggered; approximately one-third of the Senate is up for re-election every two years, but the entire body is never up for re-election in the same year (as contrasted with the House, where its entire membership is up for re-election every 2 years).
As originally established, Senators were elected by the Legislature of the State they represented in the Senate. If a senator died, resigned, or was expelled, the legislature of the state would appoint a replacement to serve out the remainder of the senator's term. If the State Legislature was not in session, its Governor could appoint a temporary replacement to serve until the legislature could elect a permanent replacement. This was superseded by the Seventeenth Amendment, which provided for the Popular Election of Senators, instead of their appointment by the State Legislature. In a nod to the less populist nature of the Senate, the Amendment tracks the vacancy procedures for the House of Representatives in requiring that the Governor call a special election to fill the vacancy, but (unlike in the House) it vests in the State Legislature the authority to allow the Governor to appoint a temporary replacement until the special election is held. Note, however, that under the original Constitution, the Governors of the states were expressly allowed by the Constitution to make temporary appointments. The current system, under the Seventeenth Amendment, allows Governors to appoint a replacement only if their state legislature has previously decided to allow the Governor to do so; otherwise, the seat must remain vacant until the special election is held to fill the seat, as in the case of a vacancy in the House.
Clause 3: Qualifications of Senators
A Senator must be at least 30 years of age, must have been a citizen of the United States for at least nine years before being elected, and must reside in the State he or she will represent at the time of the election. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Qualifications Clause as an exclusive list of qualifications that cannot be supplemented by a House of Congress exercising its Section. 5. authority to "Judge... the... Qualifications of its own Members," or by a state in its exercise of its Section. 4. authority to prescribe the "Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives,..."
Clause 4: Vice President as President of Senate; Voting power
Section Three provides that the Vice President is the President of the Senate. In modern times, the Vice President usually presides over the Senate only when a tie in the voting is anticipated. (The following section provides for the President pro tempore of the Senate, a Senator elected to the post by the Senate, to preside in the Absence of the Vice President, or when he shall exercise the Office of the President of the United States, but like the Vice President the President pro tempore, traditionally the longest-serving member of the majority party, rarely actually presides over the chamber; typically the President pro tempore deputizes junior Senators of the majority party to act as presiding officers). As a non-member of the assembly, the Vice President has only a "casting" (tie-breaking) vote. This is contrasted with the Speaker of the House, who has always been chosen from the Members of the House of Representatives, and as a member of the House is entitled to participate in debate vote on all measures, not just when ties occur, although customarily the speaker votes only rarely, and often to make or break a tie.
The tie-breaking vote has been cast 243 times by 35 different Vice Presidents.
Clause 5: President pro tempore and other officers
The Senate may elect a President pro tempore to act in the Vice President's absence. Although the Constitutional text seems to suggest to the contrary, the Senate's practice has been to elect a full-time President pro tempore at the beginning of each Congress, as opposed to making it a temporary office only existing during the Vice President's absence. As is true of the Speaker of the House, the Constitution does not require that the President pro tempore be a senator, but by convention, a senator is always chosen; since World War II, the senior member of the majority party has filled this position. The President pro tempore, as a member of the Senate, is free to make or break a tie vote like the Speaker of the House, but in the event that the possibility of a tie vote is anticipated the Vice President is routinely on hand to ensure that the Executive Branch's policy preference prevails.
Clause 6: Trial of Impeachments
The Senate is granted the sole power to try impeachments, just as the House of Lords could try impeachments in Great Britain. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution's provision that the Senate has the "sole" power to try impeachments to mean that the Senate has exclusive and unreviewable authority to determine what constitutes an adequate impeachment trial. The senators must sit on oath or affirmation, unlike the lords who voted upon their honor. The Chief Justice presides whenever the President of the United States is tried, to avoid the Vice President exercising his duties as President of the Senate and presiding over the trial of the President of the United States. Although this was probably originally intended to avoid a situation where the Vice President was presiding over a debate that could ultimately result in his promotion to the presidency (were the President convicted and removed from office), it also prevents a possibly more likely contemporary scenario, where a President accused of some offense is being tried by the Senate presided over by a Vice President who may well be sympathetic to the President, reducing the independence of the Senate's consideration of the delicate question of whether to remove a sitting chief executive. On the other hand, nothing prevents the curious circumstance of a Vice President presiding over his own impeachment trial as President of the Senate, should he be impeached (although this has never happened).
A two-thirds supermajority of those Senators "present" is required to convict, although given the obvious importance of impeachment proceedings, there are generally few absent members. In addition, requiring a two-thirds majority of those members "present" has the net effect of making a present member's decision not to cast a vote either way the same as a vote against conviction. This is as contrasted with typical practice, where a proposition passes, or not, based on whether it receives the appropriate majority of however many votes were cast, irrespective of how many members were present but chose not to vote. However, much as impeachment trials generally have few members absent, the importance of impeachment trials is unlikely to produce many abstentions (i.e., non-votes) by present members.
Clause 7: Judgment in cases of impeachment; Punishment on conviction
If any officer is convicted on impeachment, he or she is immediately removed from office, and may be barred from holding any public office in the future. No other punishments may be inflicted pursuant to the impeachment proceeding, but the convicted party remains liable to trial and punishment in the courts for civil and criminal charges.
Section 4: Congressional elections
Clause 1: Time, place, and manner of holding
This clause generally commits to the States the authority to determine the "times, places and manner of holding elections," which includes the preliminary stages of the election process (such as a primary election), while reserving to Congress the authority to preempt State regulations with uniform national rules. Congress has exercised this authority to determine a uniform date for federal elections: the Tuesday following the first Monday in November.
Because Congress has not enacted any on-point regulations, States still retain the authority to regulate the dates on which other aspects of the election process are held (registration, primary elections, etc.) and where elections will be held. As for regulating the "manner" of elections, the Supreme Court has interpreted this to mean "matters like notices, registration, supervision of voting, protection of voters, prevention of fraud and corrupt practices, counting of votes, duties of inspectors and canvassers, and making and publication of election returns." The Supreme Court has held that States may not exercise their power to determine the "manner" of holding elections to impose term limits on their congressional delegation.
One of the most significant ways that States regulate the "manner" of elections is their power to draw election districts. Although in theory Congress could draw the district map for each State, it has not exercised this level of oversight. Congress has, however, required the States to conform to certain practices when drawing districts. States are currently required to use a single-member district scheme, whereby the State is divided into as many election districts for Representatives in the House of Representatives as the size of its representation in that body (that is to say, Representatives cannot be elected at-large from the whole State unless the State has only one Representative in the House, nor can districts elect more than 1 Representative).
Congress once imposed additional requirements that districts be composed of contiguous territory, be "compact," and have equal populations within each State. Congress has allowed those requirements to lapse, but the Supreme Court has re-imposed the population requirement on the States under the Equal Protection Clause and is suspicious of districts that do not meet the other "traditional" districting criteria of compactness and contiguity.
The restriction on Congress's inability to "make or alter" regulations pertaining to the places of choosing Senators is largely an anachronism. When State Legislatures selected Senators, if Congress had been able to prescribe the place for choosing Senators, it could have in effect told each State where its state capital must be located. This would have been offensive to the concept of each State being sovereign over its own internal affairs. Now that Senators are popularly elected, it is largely a moot point.
Clause 2: Sessions of Congress
Clause 2 requires that Congress must assemble at least once each year. This was designed to force Congress to make itself available at least once in a year to provide the legislative action the country needed in the face of the transportation and communication challenges present in the 18th century. In modern practice, Congress is in session virtually year-round.
Originally, the Constitution provided that the annual meeting was to be on the first Monday in December unless otherwise provided by law. The government under the Articles of Confederation had determined, as a transitional measure to the new constitution, that the date for "commencing proceedings" under the U.S. Constitution would be March 4, 1789. Since the first term of the original federal officials began on this date and ended 2, 4, or 6 years later, this became the date on which new federal officials took office in subsequent years. This meant that, every other year, although a new Congress was elected in November, it did not come into office until the following March, with a "lame duck" Congress convening in the interim. As modern communications and travel made it less necessary to wait 4 months from Election Day to the swearing-in of the elected officials, it became increasingly cumbersome to elect officials in November but wait until March for them to take office. Congress eventually proposed that elected officials take office in January, instead of March; since this required cutting short (by a couple of months) the terms of the elected federal officials at the time of the proposal, Congress proposed the Twentieth Amendment, which established the present dates for when federal officials take office. While the Constitution always granted Congress the authority to meet on a different day without the need to pass an amendment, 2 of the Twentieth Amendment "tidied up" the constitutional text by paralleling the original provision requiring that the Congress meet at least once a year in December, and changing it to January 3 (unless changed by law). Although the original Constitution allowed Congress to change its annual meeting date by statute, this change eliminated any reference to a requirement in the Constitution that a lame duck Congress meet in the period between the election of a new Congress and its taking office.
Section 5: Procedure
Clause 1: Qualifications of Members
Section Five states that a majority of each House constitutes a quorum to do business; a smaller number may adjourn the House or compel the attendance of absent members. In practice, the quorum requirement is all but ignored. A quorum is assumed to be present unless a quorum call, requested by a member, proves otherwise. Rarely do members ask for quorum calls to demonstrate the absence of a quorum; more often, they use the quorum call as a delaying tactic.
Sometimes, unqualified individuals have been admitted to Congress. For instance, the Senate once admitted John Henry Eaton, a twenty-eight-year-old, in 1818 (the admission was inadvertent, as Eaton's birth date was unclear at the time). In 1934, a twenty-nine-year-old, Rush Holt, was elected to the Senate; he agreed to wait six months, until his thirtieth birthday, to take the oath. The Senate ruled in that case that the age requirement applied as of the date of the taking of the oath, not the date of election.
Clause 2: Rules
Each House can determine its own Rules (assuming a quorum is present), and may punish any of its members. A two-thirds vote is necessary to expel a member. Section 5, Clause 2 does not provide specific guidance to each House regarding when and how each House may change its rules, leaving details to the respective chambers.
Clause 3: Record of proceedings
Each House must keep and publish a Journal, though it may choose to keep any part of the Journal secret. The decisions of the House not the words spoken during debates are recorded in the Journal; if one-fifth of those present (assuming a quorum is present) request it, the votes of the members on a particular question must also be entered.
Clause 4: Adjournment
Neither House may adjourn, without the consent of the other, for more than three days. Often, a House will hold pro forma sessions every three days; such sessions are merely held to fulfill the constitutional requirement, and not to conduct business. Furthermore, neither House may meet in any place other than that designated for both Houses (the Capitol), without the consent of the other House.
Section 6: Compensation, privileges, and restrictions on holding civil office
Clause 1: Compensation and legal protection
Senators and Representatives set their own compensation. Under the Twenty-seventh Amendment, any change in their compensation will not take effect until after the next congressional election.
Members of both Houses have certain privileges, based on those enjoyed by the members of the British Parliament. Members attending, going to or returning from either House are privileged from arrest, except for treason, felony or breach of the peace. One may not sue a Senator or Representative for slander occurring during Congressional debate, nor may speech by a member of Congress during a Congressional session be the basis for criminal prosecution. The latter was affirmed when Mike Gravel published over 4,000 pages of the Pentagon Papers in the Congressional Record, which might have otherwise been a criminal offense. This clause has also been interpreted in Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972) to provide protection to aides and staff of sitting members of Congress, so long as their activities relate to legislative matters.
Clause 2: Independence from the executive
Senators and Representatives may not simultaneously serve in Congress and hold a position in the executive branch. This restriction is meant to protect legislative independence by preventing the president from using patronage to buy votes in Congress. It is a major difference from the political system in the British Parliament, where cabinet ministers are required to be members of parliament.
Furthermore, Senators and Representatives cannot resign to take newly created or higher-paying political positions; rather, they must wait until the conclusion of the term for which they were elected. If Congress increases the salary of a particular officer, it may later reduce that salary to permit an individual to resign from Congress and take that position (known as the Saxbe fix). The effects of the clause were discussed in 1937, when Senator Hugo Black was appointed an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court with some time left in his Senate term. Just prior to the appointment, Congress had increased the pension available to Justices retiring at the age of seventy. It was therefore suggested by some that the office's emolument had been increased during Black's Senatorial term, and that therefore Black could not take office as a Justice. The response, however, was that Black was fifty-one years old, and would not receive the increased pension until at least 19 years later, long after his Senate term had expired.
Section 7: Bills
Clause 1: Bills of revenue
This establishes the method for making Acts of Congress. Accordingly, any bill may originate in either House of Congress, except for a revenue bill, which may originate only in the House of Representatives. In practice, the Senate can simply circumvent this requirement by substituting the text of any bill previously passed by the House with the text of a revenue bill. When the Senate sends an appropriation bill to the House, the House may return it to the Senate with a blue slip, thereby settling the question in practice. Either House may amend any bill, including revenue and appropriation bills.
The Origination Clause stemmed from an English parliamentary convention that all money bills must have their first reading in the House of Commons. It was intended to ensure that the "power of the purse" lies with the legislative body responsible to the people. The clause was also part of a compromise between small and large states. The latter were unhappy with equal representation in the Senate.
Clause 2: From bills to law
This clause is known as the Presentment Clause. Before a bill becomes law, it must be presented to the President, who has ten days (excluding Sundays) to act upon it. If the President signs the bill, it becomes law. If he disapproves of the bill, he must return it to the House in which it originated together with his objections. This procedure has become known as the veto, although that particular word does not appear in the text of Article One. The bill does not then become law unless both Houses, by two-thirds votes, override the veto. If the President neither signs nor returns the bill within the ten-day limit, the bill becomes law, unless the Congress has adjourned in the meantime, thereby preventing the President from returning the bill to the House in which it originated. In the latter case, the President, by taking no action on the bill towards the end of a session, exercises a "pocket veto", which Congress may not override. In the former case, where the President allows a bill to become law unsigned, there is no common name for the practice, but recent scholarship has termed it a "default enactment."
What exactly constitutes an adjournment for the purposes of the pocket veto has been unclear. In the Pocket Veto Case (1929), the Supreme Court held that "the determinative question in reference to an 'adjournment' is not whether it is a final adjournment of Congress or an interim adjournment, such as an adjournment of the first session, but whether it is one that 'prevents' the President from returning the bill to the House in which it originated within the time allowed." Since neither House of Congress was in session, the President could not return the bill to one of them, thereby permitting the use of the pocket veto. In Wright v. United States (1938), however, the Court ruled that adjournments of one House only did not constitute an adjournment of Congress required for a pocket veto. In such cases, the Secretary or Clerk of the House in question was ruled competent to receive the bill.
Clause 3: Presidential veto
In 1996, Congress passed the Line Item Veto Act, which permitted the President, at the time of the signing of the bill, to rescind certain expenditures. The Congress could disapprove the cancellation and reinstate the funds. The President could veto the disapproval, but the Congress, by a two-thirds vote in each House, could override the veto. In the case Clinton v. City of New York, the Supreme Court found the Line Item Veto Act unconstitutional because it violated the Presentment clause. First, the procedure delegated legislative powers to the President, thereby violating the nondelegation doctrine. Second, the procedure violated the terms of Section Seven, which state, "if he approve [the bill] he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it." Thus, the President may sign the bill, veto it, or do nothing, but he may not amend the bill and then sign it.
Every bill, order, resolution, or vote that must be passed by both Houses, except on a question of adjournment, must be presented to the President before becoming law. However, to propose a constitutional amendment, two-thirds of both Houses may submit it to the states for the ratification, without any consideration by the President, as prescribed in Article V.
Some Presidents have made very extensive use of the veto, while others have not used it at all. Grover Cleveland, for instance, vetoed over four hundred bills during his first term in office; Congress overrode only two of those vetoes. Meanwhile, seven Presidents have never used the veto power. There have been 2,560 vetoes, including pocket vetoes.
Section 8: Powers of Congress
Congress's powers are enumerated in Section Eight:
Many powers of Congress have been interpreted broadly. Most notably, the Taxing and Spending, Interstate Commerce, and Necessary and Proper Clauses have been deemed to grant expansive powers to Congress.
Congress may lay and collect taxes for the "common defense" or "general welfare" of the United States. The U.S. Supreme Court has not often defined "general welfare," leaving the political question to Congress. In United States v. Butler (1936), the Court for the first time construed the clause. The dispute centered on a tax collected from processors of agricultural products such as meat; the funds raised by the tax were not paid into the general funds of the treasury, but were rather specially earmarked for farmers. The Court struck down the tax, ruling that the general welfare language in the Taxing and Spending Clause related only to "matters of national, as distinguished from local, welfare". Congress continues to make expansive use of the Taxing and Spending Clause; for instance, the social security program is authorized under the Taxing and Spending Clause.
Congress is permitted to borrow money on the credit of the United States. In 1871, when deciding Knox v. Lee, the Court ruled that this clause permitted Congress to emit bills and make them legal tender in satisfaction of debts. Whenever Congress borrows money, it is obligated to repay the sum as stipulated in the original agreement. However, such agreements are only "binding on the conscience of the sovereign", as the doctrine of sovereign immunity prevents a creditor from suing in court if the government reneges its commitment.
The Supreme Court has seldom restrained the use of the commerce clause for widely varying purposes. The first important decision related to the commerce clause was Gibbons v. Ogden, decided by a unanimous Court in 1824. The case involved conflicting federal and state laws: Thomas Gibbons had a federal permit to navigate steamboats in the Hudson River, while the other, Aaron Ogden, had a monopoly to do the same granted by the state of New York. Ogden contended that "commerce" included only buying and selling of goods and not their transportation. Chief Justice John Marshall rejected this notion. Marshall suggested that "commerce" included navigation of goods, and that it "must have been contemplated" by the Framers. Marshall added that Congress's power over commerce "is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed in the Constitution".
Chief Justice John Marshall established a broad interpretation of the Commerce Clause. The expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause was restrained during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when a laissez-faire attitude dominated the Court. In United States v. E. C. Knight Company (1895), the Supreme Court limited the newly-enacted Sherman Antitrust Act, which had sought to break up the monopolies dominating the nation's economy. The Court ruled that Congress could not regulate the manufacture of goods, even if they were later shipped to other states. Chief Justice Melville Fuller wrote, "commerce succeeds to manufacture, and is not a part of it."
The U.S. Supreme Court sometimes ruled New Deal programs unconstitutional because they stretched the meaning of the commerce clause. In Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, (1935) the Court unanimously struck down industrial codes regulating the slaughter of poultry, declaring that Congress could not regulate commerce relating to the poultry, which had "come to a permanent rest within the State." As Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes put it, "so far as the poultry here in question is concerned, the flow of interstate commerce has ceased." Judicial rulings against attempted use of Congress's Commerce Clause powers continued during the 1930s.
It was only in 1937 that the Supreme Court gave up the laissez-faire doctrine as it decided a landmark case, National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Company. The legislation in question, the National Labor Relations Act, prevented employers from engaging in "unfair labor practices" such as firing workers for joining unions. The Court ruled to sustain the Act's provisions. The Court, returning to the theories propounded by John Marshall, ruled that Congress could pass laws regulating actions that even indirectly influenced interstate commerce. Further decisions expanded the Congress's powers under the commerce clause. This dramatic change in the Court's thinking was influenced by the threat of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Court Packing scheme.
In the 1990s, the Court acted to restrain Congress's exercise of its power to regulate commerce. In United States v. Lopez, the Court found that Congress could not exercise "Police power" reserved to the States by use of the Commerce Clause.
In contrast to United States v. Lopez , the powers defined in the Commerce Clause have been elastically re-interpreted to cover non-commercial activity not just between but within the states. In 2005, the Supreme Court controversially ruled in Gonzales v. Raich, that the Commerce Clause granted Congress the authority to regulate Cannabis plants grown, processed, and consumed within the state on private property. The court reclassified the plant as a commodity even though it was not sold or exchanged in any transaction.
Other powers of Congress
Congress may establish uniform laws relating to naturalization and bankruptcy. It may also coin money, regulate the value of American or foreign currency and punish counterfeiters. Congress may fix the standards of weights and measures. Furthermore, Congress may establish post offices and post roads (the roads, however, need not be exclusively for the conveyance of mail). Congress may promote the progress of science and useful arts by granting copyrights and patents of limited duration. Section eight, clause eight of Article One, known as the Copyright Clause, is the only instance of the word "right" used in the original constitution (though the word does appear in several Amendments). Though perpetual copyrights and patents are prohibited, the Supreme Court has ruled in Eldred v. Ashcroft (2003) that repeated extensions to the term of copyright do not constitute perpetual copyright; also note that this is the only power granted where the means to accomplish its stated purpose is specifically provided for. Courts inferior to the Supreme Court may be established by Congress.
Congress has several powers related to war and the armed forces. Under the War Powers Clause, only Congress may declare war, but in several cases it has, without declaring war, granted the President the authority to engage in military conflicts. Five wars have been declared in American history: the War of 1812, the Mexican-American War, the Spanish-American War, World War I and World War II. Some historians argue that the legal doctrines and legislation passed during the operations against Pancho Villa constitute a sixth declaration of war. Congress may grant letters of marque and reprisal. Congress may establish and support the armed forces, but no appropriation made for the support of the army may be used for more than two years. This provision was inserted because the Framers feared the establishment of a standing army, beyond civilian control, during peacetime. Congress may regulate or call forth the state militias, but the states retain the authority to appoint officers and train personnel. Congress also has exclusive power to make rules and regulations governing the land and naval forces. Although the executive branch and the Pentagon have asserted an ever-increasing measure of involvement in this process, the U.S. Supreme Court has often reaffirmed Congress's exclusive hold on this power (e.g. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953)). Congress used this power twice soon after World War II with the enactment of two statutes: the Uniform Code of Military Justice to improve the quality and fairness of courts martial and military justice, and the Federal Tort Claims Act which among other rights had allowed military service persons to sue for damages until the U.S. Supreme Court repealed that section of the statute in a divisive series of cases, known collectively as the Feres Doctrine.
Congress has the exclusive right to legislate "in all cases whatsoever" for the nation's capital, the District of Columbia. Congress chooses to devolve some of such authority to the elected mayor and council of District of Columbia. Nevertheless, Congress remains free to enact any legislation for the District so long as constitutionally permissible, to overturn any legislation by the city government, and technically to revoke the city government at any time. Congress may also exercise such jurisdiction over land purchased from the states for the erection of forts and other buildings.
Necessary and Proper clause
Finally, Congress has the power to do whatever is "necessary and proper" to carry out its enumerated powers and, crucially, all others vested in it. This has been interpreted to authorize criminal prosecution of those whose actions have a "substantial effect" on interstate commerce in Wickard v. Filburn ; however, Thomas Jefferson, in the Kentucky Resolutions, supported by James Madison, maintained that a penal power could not be inferred from a power to regulate, and that the only penal powers were for treason, counterfeiting, piracy and felony on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations.
The necessary and proper clause has been interpreted extremely broadly, thereby giving Congress wide latitude in legislation. The first landmark case involving the clause was McCulloch v. Maryland (1819), which involved the establishment of a national bank. Alexander Hamilton, in advocating the creation of the bank, argued that there was "a more or less direct" relationship between the bank and "the powers of collecting taxes, borrowing money, regulating trade between the states, and raising and maintaining fleets and navies". Thomas Jefferson countered that Congress's powers "can all be carried into execution without a national bank. A bank therefore is not necessary, and consequently not authorized by this phrase". Chief Justice John Marshall agreed with the former interpretation. Marshall wrote that a Constitution listing all of Congress's powers "would partake of a prolixity of a legal code and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind". Since the Constitution could not possibly enumerate the "minor ingredients" of the powers of Congress, Marshall "deduced" that Congress had the authority to establish a bank from the "great outlines" of the general welfare, commerce and other clauses. Under this doctrine of the necessary and proper clause, Congress has sweepingly broad powers (known as implied powers) not explicitly enumerated in the Constitution. However, the Congress cannot enact laws solely on the implied powers, any action must be necessary and proper in the execution of the enumerated powers.
Section 9: Limits on Congress
The next section of Article One provided limits on Congress's powers:
Although the international slave trade was allowed until 1808, Congress prohibited it on January 1, 1808, the first day it was permitted to do so. Until 1808, however, the Constitution permitted Congress to levy a maximum duty of ten dollars per slave imported into the United States.
A writ of habeas corpus is a legal action against unlawful detainment that commands a law enforcement agency or other body that has a person in custody to have a court inquire into the legality of the detention. The court may order the person released if the reason for detention is deemed insufficient or unjustifiable. The Constitution further provides that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may not be suspended "unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it". In Ex parte Milligan (1866), the Supreme Court decided that the suspension of habeas corpus was lawful, but military tribunals did not apply to citizens in states that had upheld the authority of the Constitution and where civilian courts were still operating.
A bill of attainder is a law by which a person is immediately convicted without trial. An ex post facto law is a law which applies retroactively, punishing someone for an act that was only made criminal after it was done. The ex post facto clause does not apply to civil matters.
Section Nine reiterates the provision from Section Two that direct taxes must be apportioned by state populations. Furthermore, no tax may be imposed on exports from any state. Congress may not, by revenue or commerce legislation, give preference to ports of one state over those of another; neither may it require ships from one state to pay duties in another. All funds belonging to the Treasury may not be withdrawn except according to law. Modern practice is that Congress annually passes a number of appropriation bills authorizing the expenditure of public money. The Constitution requires that a regular statement of such expenditures be published.
The Title of Nobility Clause prohibits Congress from granting any title of nobility. In addition, it specifies that no civil officer may accept, without the consent of Congress, any gift, payment, office or title from a foreign ruler or state. However, a U.S. citizen may receive foreign office before or after their period of public service.
Section 10: Limits on the States
Clause 1: Contracts Clause
States may not exercise certain powers reserved for the federal government: they may not enter into treaties, alliances or confederations, grant letters of marque or reprisal, coin money or issue bills of credit (such as currency). Furthermore, no state may make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts, which expressly forbids any state government (but not the federal government) from "making a tender" (i.e., authorizing something that may be offered in payment) of any type or form of money to meet any financial obligation, unless that form of money is coins made of gold or silver (or a medium of exchange backed by and redeemable in gold or silver coins, as noted in Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank). Much of this clause is devoted to preventing the States from using or creating any currency other than that created by Congress. In Federalist no. 44, Madison explains that "... it may be observed that the same reasons which shew the necessity of denying to the States the power of regulating coin, prove with equal force that they ought not to be at liberty to substitute a paper medium in the place of coin. Had every State a right to regulate the value of its coin, there might be as many different currencies as States; and thus the intercourse among them would be impeded." Moreover, the states may not pass bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, impair the obligation of contracts or grant titles of nobility.
The Contract Clause was the subject of much contentious litigation in the 19th century. It was first interpreted by the Supreme Court in 1810, when Fletcher v. Peck was decided. The case involved the Yazoo land scandal, in which the Georgia legislature authorized the sale of land to speculators at low prices. The bribery involved in the passage of the authorizing legislation was so blatant that a Georgia mob attempted to lynch the corrupt members of the legislature. Following elections, the legislature passed a law that rescinded the contracts granted by the corrupt legislators. The validity of the annulment of the sale was questioned in the Supreme Court. In writing for a unanimous court, Chief Justice John Marshall asked, "What is a contract?" His answer was: "a compact between two or more parties." Marshall argued that the sale of land by the Georgia legislature, though fraught with corruption, was a valid "contract". He added that the state had no right to annul the purchase of the land, since doing so would impair the obligations of contract.
The definition of a contract propounded by Chief Justice Marshall was not as simple as it may seem. In 1819, the Court considered whether a corporate charter could be construed as a contract. The case of Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward involved Dartmouth College, which had been established under a Royal Charter granted by King George III. The Charter created a board of twelve trustees for the governance of the College. In 1815, however, New Hampshire passed a law increasing the board's membership to twenty-one with the aim that public control could be exercised over the College. The Court, including Marshall, ruled that New Hampshire could not amend the charter, which was ruled to be a contract since it conferred "vested rights" on the trustees.
The Marshall Court determined another dispute in Sturges v. Crowninshield. The case involved a debt that was contracted in early 1811. Later in that year, the state of New York passed a bankruptcy law, under which the debt was later discharged. The Supreme Court ruled that a retroactively applied state bankruptcy law impaired the obligation to pay the debt, and therefore violated the Constitution. In Ogden v. Saunders (1827), however, the court decided that state bankruptcy laws could apply to debts contracted after the passage of the law. State legislation on the issue of bankruptcy and debtor relief has not been much of an issue since the adoption of a comprehensive federal bankruptcy law in 1898.
Clause 2: Export Clause
Still more powers are prohibited of the states. States may not, without the consent of Congress, tax imports or exports except for the fulfillment of state inspection laws (which may be revised by Congress). The net revenue of the tax is paid not to the state, but to the federal Treasury.
Clause 3: Compact Clause
Under the Compact Clause, states may not, without the consent of Congress, keep troops or armies during times of peace. They may not enter into alliances nor compacts with foreign states, nor engage in war unless invaded. States may, however, organize and arm a militia. Currently the National Guard and State Militias with federal oversight fulfill this function.
The idea of allowing Congress to have say over agreements between states traces back to the numerous controversies that arose between various colonies. Eventually compromises would be created between the two colonies and these compromises would be submitted to the Crown for approval. After the American Revolutionary War, the Articles of Confederation allowed states to appeal to Congress to settle disputes between the states over boundaries or "any cause whatever". The Articles of Confederation also required Congressional approval for "any treaty or alliance" in which a state was one of the parties.
There have been a number of Supreme Court cases, especially Virginia v. Tennessee, , concerning what constitutes valid congressional consent to an interstate compact. The Court found that some agreements among states stand even without Congress consent. According to the Court, the Compact Clause requires congressional consent only if the agreement among the states is "directed to the formation of any combination tending to the increase of political power in the States, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States". The National Popular Vote Interstate Compact, which is not yet effective, might be the first modern case that truly stretches the limits of the Compact Clause.
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